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WHAT HAS ETHICS TO LEARN FROM MEDICAL ETHICS? 
by 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 
Ethics is a well-established part of the philosophical curriculum; several thousand 
courses are given on it every year in the United States and there is a general 
academic consensus on what texts ought to be read, what the central issues and 
problems are and on the place of the subject within philosophical enquiry and 
teaching. Medical ethics by contrast is small-scale, riddled with contentiousness, 
open to every kind of innovation and simultaneously outspoken and tentative in its 
claims upon the academic world. It is scarcely surprising therefore that many 
philosophers and some physicians have seen moral philosophy as a soundly based, 
intellectually affluent discipline whose task it is to bring conceptual aid and 
comfort to the problem-ri dden, uncertain enquiries of medical ethics. The 
philosophers on this view are to constitute a kind of intellectual peace corps, the 
medical profession a morally underdeveloped country. Or to alter the metaphor, 
the philosophers are the blood donors, the physicians, surgeons and nurses the 
patients badly in need of a transfusion. 
I do not want to deny either that there is a crisis in medicine concerning medical 
ethics or that an important symptom of this crisis is the way in which philosophy is 
now, in a way and to an extent that would have been quite incomprehensible and 
unpredictable twenty years ago, being invited not merely into medical schools, but 
into hospitals. Nor could I deny that whereas many physicians and philosophers 
jointly recognize a point of crisis in medical ethics, almost no philosophers see 
anything like a crisis in philosophy, more particularly in moral philosophy. Yet I 
want to af�rm in this paper a conviction that philosophy is in at least as grave a 
crisis as medicine. We have two crises not one. Should we be twice as pessimistic? 
The answer interestingly is 'No'. 'Pwo crises may on occasion be better than one and 
this, so I am going to argue, is one of these occasions. For a careful description of 
the crisis in medical ethics will, I shall suggest, throw a sharp and illuminating light 
on the crisis in ethics. I shall not be so silly as to ignore what moral philosophy does 
have to teach medical ethics; but I shall maintain that at this particular stage of 
their historkal dialogue it ils medical ethics that has in the main to be teacher, ethics 
the pupil. 
I 
I therefore have to begin with a description of the relevant features of the crisis 
in medicine . That crisis is the outcome of the rapid successive changes in medicine 
in the last eighty years. In 1900 the percentage of the total mortality in the United 
States due to the eleven major infectious conditions was over 40%; the percentage 
due to the three major chronic conditions - heart disease, cancer and stroke - was 
under 20%. In 1973 the percentage due to the eleven major infectious conditions 
was only 6%. The percentage due to the three major chron ic conditions was 58%. 
This reversal was itself a major victory for medicine, if we include in medicine 
various preventive, sanitary and public health measures. Those who once died of 
diphtheria, tuberculosis or poliomyetitis now live long enough to contract cancer or 
heart disease. But the definition of the role of tl:le physician in the period in which 
the battle was primarily with the major infectious diseases rests on assumptions 
which the victory over these diseases undermines. For it was very natural in that 
period to think of the physician as an applied scientist whose task was to identify 
certain chemical or physiological states in the patient and to change or prevent 
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those states by chemical or biochemical agents. A patient becomes a locus for 
diseased or damaged tissue; a patient is nothing but an experimental subject in a 
hospitaJ bed instead of on a laboratory bench. Consequently the division of Jabor 
among physicians is that approp riate to applied scientists and corresponds to the 
specialization of the sciences. A patient is only the particular instantiation of a set 
of law-like generalisations, and the physician is concerned only with those law-like 
generalisations which belong to his particular scientific discipline. There is 
consequently no more reason for there to be any personal element in the 
relationship between physician and patient, or rather those parts of the patient 
allocated to a particular type of specialist under this division of labor, than there is 
between a biochemist and the culture with which he is experimenting. 
The physician thus defined naturally enough contrasts his role. sharply with at 
least three other types of role. The first is that of the nurse. The nurse is concerned 
with care and effective care is in this type of medicine only a substructure ; the 
patient must be cared for by the nurse, so that and only in the ways that will enable 
the physician to discharge his function effectively. The role of the nurse is, in this 
kind of medicine, rightly lower in the medical hierarchy than that of the physician. 
A second contrast is both with the medical sociologist and with the public health 
official. The physician, defining him or herself (and in the vast majority of cases in 
this period himself) as an applied scientist of one specialized type, is concerned 
with some causal chains, but not with others. The patient may have been infected 
with a microorganism that is carried by rats and the incidence of rats in a given 
geographical area may be due to specific social conditions, but the physician thus 
defined has no concern with social structures and therefore no concern with causal 
chains which pass beyond the chemical and the bacteriological to the social. 
The physician's role was on this view to be contrasted not only with that of the 
nurse and that of the sociologist, but also with that of the moralist. � private 
person of course the physician may pose moral dilemmas, give moral advice, seek 
moral guidance; but qua physician he was no more to be concerned with such 
matters than is the biochemist. He was of course professionally committed to 
certain values - that of his patient's health for example - in a way which the 
biochemist was not. But these values ra�ely needed to be made explicit. 
This view of the physician's role never of course completely usurped older 
conceptions of what a physician was, especially in such areas as paediatrics and 
family medicine. But between 1920 and 1970 it was enormously influential. Its 
failure to maintain its ascendancy - and it is important to remember how influential 
it still is - has only partly been due to the changes in treatment reflectfd in the large 
changes in the causes of mortality during this century. It is also of great importance 
that the implicit values taken for granted in so much modern medicine had to be 
spelled out and could no longer be taken for granted as a result of the 
improvements in medical technology. 
To put matters oversimply : from Hippocrates until almost the present the three 
ends of medical practice were highly congruent with each other. To pursue any one 
of the three generally involved pursu ing the other two also. What were those three 
ends? First to stave off the patient's death for as long as possible; secon dly to 
prevent the patient's suffering pain or physical disability as far as possible; and 
thirdly to promote the patient's general health and physical well-being. The 
physician or surgeon presides at our birth and cares for our nutrition, attempts to 
cure our diseases and to mend our broken bones, and in so doing gives us 
expectations of a longer life. But with contemporary medicine these ends fall apart. 
Th� chronic conditions which require treatment and the technology available as the 
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instrument for treatment allows us to continue life in such a way as to prolong 
suffering or to extend disability. There may be no way to promote my well-being 
which does not involve bringing about my death at a certain point; it may even be 
better for me if I had not been born. The physician or surgeon, therefore, pledged 
by his oath and the tradition of his profession to pursue all three ends now is 
forced, especially with the chronic conditions, to make choices, choices sufficiently 
frequent in occurrence and sufficiently harsh in character for moral choice to have 
become a central medical task. 
This thrusting of choice between morally significant alternatives upon the 
physician has been accompanied by two other changes. First the medical tasks in 
relation to the chronic condition of the incurable patient reverse the order 
appropriate to treatment of the infectious diseases. Whereas care used to provide 
the substructure for treatment,  treatment is now a series of episodes within the 
total pattern of care. Whereas death used to be unambiguously the last enemy, the 
incurable patient's transitions from one stage to another now have to be viewe-0 as 
part of his or her total approach to death. And this is not just a reversal for the 
physician, it is a reversal for modem man. ''The free man,'' said Spinoza, "thinks 
about nothing less than about dying" and in so saying he was the prophet of those 
perhaps rather less than free men who removed the skull from the mantelpiece, who 
ceased to walk in graveyards, who spoke not of "my parerlts' d!eath" but of "our 
loved one's passing on", hoping to exorcise the fear of death by euphemism. 
Medicine, and not only medicine, has been forced to recognize that the incurable 
patient is a dying man or woman, that many of us are incurable now and that we 
are all incurable in the end. 
Moreover the physician has been compelled to take a wider view of causal 
chains. Consider for example the role of stress in heart conditions. It turns out that 
not only the amount of stress but the way in which stress is addressed has a 
significant effect upon the heart, The physician cannot escape tracing the causes of 
stress in both the psychological and the social environment. 
The morally self-conscious physician therefore finds him or herself immersed in 
contradiction and incompatibility; for central features of his or her medical 
situation are at odds with the inherited role which he or she is called upon to 
inhabit. And this immersion has been largely brought about by the way in which 
the problems of the incurable patient have become central 'to medicine. Because the 
relationship of treatment to care is not what it was, the relationship of nurse to 
physician cannot be justified in the way that it was. Because the relationship of 
medicine to moral and social questions is not what it was, the relationship of either 
nurse or physician to patient cannot be justified in the way that it was. The 
physician has partly lost a well-defined and clearly legitimated rule and status and 
has done so just at the time when the moral dimensions of his enterprise can no 
longer be taken care of by some version of the Hippocratic Oath and the constraints 
of professional and legal norms. This disruption of the physician's role and the fact 
that the ends the physician pursues are now often mutually incongruent compel the 
physician to make important moral choices just when he has been deprived of any 
well·defined standpoint from which to make them. 
It is not surprising that medicine in this state should be-come overtly and 
explicitly philosophical . Such questions as those concerning the difference between 
the relationship of cure and care or what place causal chains have in scientific 
explanations or what we ought to mean by 'death' have a long philosophical 
ancestry and these questions are now internal to medicine. Every physician is 
bound to embody in his practice, whether he likes it or not, whether he knows it or 
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not, an implicit answer to at least some of them. Medical men and women have as 
much chance of not being philosophers as M. Jourdain had of not speaking prose. 
And the area in which this is likely to be recognized, because of the immediacy of 
the problems, is that of medical ethics. How unsurprising it is then that recognizing 
the crisis in his own theory and practice the morally concerned physician should 
look in the ctiredion of professional philosophy and more specifically of ethics. Alas, 
what does he find? 
II 
Twenty years ago philosophy seemed full of promise. The impact of 
Wittgenstein's later writings was being felt; at Oxford H.L.A. Hart and J.L. Austin 
seemed to be mining new veins; phenomenology had the achievements of 
Merleau-Pon ty and a quite new impact of Husserl reread; Hegel was being 
rediscussed; Quine and Sellars had opened up new perspectives; Chomsky had 
published his first book; 'in Belgrade and Warsaw and Budapest there was the 
promise of revisionist Marxism; Sartre was about to synthesize existentialism and 
Marxism; Goldman and Strawson were both at work on Kant. The only problem for 
someone of my generation was how to choose between such a dazzling variety of 
approaches and whether or not all the great work might not have been completed 
before one had a chance to share in it. 
And where are we now twenty years later? Almost in precisely the same place. It 
is not that a good deal of fine philosophy has not been done, but in nearly all the 
key problems of the discipline things remain substantially as they were. And this is 
equally true for very different schools of thought. Analytical philosophy, 
phenomenology, neoMarxism, the new Hegelianism, the semi technical programs of 
modern semantics all share a failure to make good on their earlier promises, even if 
we judge each project on its own terms. 
What is true of philosophy in general is also true of ethics. Analytical, semantic 
or phenomenological approaches have provided for the most part new vocabularies 
to express old contentions, old contentions that remain as or more vulnerable than 
they always were. Our contemporary utilitarians mark little advance, if any, on 
Sidgwick; our universalisab ility theorists have provided no answer to Kant's acutest 
critics; and the two most fashionable and publicity-winning books recently 
published in the area turned out to be reissues of the most advanced thought of the 
seventeenth century. The terms one is tempted to use to describe the situation 
derive from art history: pastiche, eclecticism, mannerism. The sophistication of 
contemporary vocabulary and technique fail to disguise the fact that a very limited 
and familiar array of concepts, assertions and problems are being deployed. [t is 
therefore perhaps worthwhile to identify lhese historically, to ask what is specific 
to modern moral philosophy (as constrasted with some of its predecessors in other 
and earlier cultures) in ordler to discover the source of its poverty. What is it that 
the diverse pain ts of view in contemporary ethics share? 
First of all, there is a certain conception of the moral agent embodying in tum a 
certain conception of morality. This conception of morality requires that the moral 
agent be able to free him or herself from all positivity, to stand back from any 
particular norm-governed institution or practice or tradition, so as to be able to 
pass judgment upon it from an independent point of view. Qua moral agent 
therefore the individual i s  detached from all social memberships, loyalties and 
circumstances. The moral agenes identity is pre-social ; it cannot derive from any 
social role which he or she happens to fill. For of any alleged moral authority 
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embodied in social rules, practices or communities . such as those of church, state, 
family. school, city, profession - the individual may and must enquire "But do its 
pronouncements and practices have any genuine moral worth?" Hence the standard 
of moral worth must be found outside and beyondl any concrete human community. 
The standpoint of morality is, on this view, detached from all social particularity. 
The moral agent thus has a ghostly, abstract and largely disembodied existence. 
Like the self in Sartre's philosophy, he or she inhabits any social role only 
accidentally and contingently, as a visitor, so to speak. He or she can have no 
ultimately binding social or institutional loyalties. The only desires ascribed to him 
or her are, or at least are intended to be, culturally non-specific. 
A second distinctive characteristic of contemporary and recent moral philosophy 
is its preoccupation with rules and their justification and status. Modern Kantians, 
utilitarians and contract theorists differ as to how rules are to be justified and as to 
what their import and authority may be. But they never seem to doubt that the 
intellectual content of morality is just a set of universal rules or that moral 
judgment consists in the application of such a. rule to a particular case. Moral 
problems are conceived as problems of how to arrive at correct or at least justifiable 
·moral judgments, namely which rule to apply in some particular situation where 
there are competing and conflicting rules. The moral agent is thus both legislator 
and judge, himself creating by the content of his legislation the dilemmas, the 
solution of which provide him with his judicial task. 
It is important to notice that both the conception of the moral agent as an 
abstract, non-social universal legislator and the conception of morality as centrally 
concerned with rules are distinctively modern. Aristotle, for example, is in the 
Ethics concerned with the good for man as such; but any particular man fails to be 
man as such if he is not, actually or potentially, the citizen of a p1is, that 
institution without which a man becomes either a god or a beast. Likewise ristotle 
in his account of practical reasoning never mentions rules at all. We learn how to 
make particular judgments by acquiring a grasp of the virtues so that we come to 
recognize what a courageous or just or generous man would do in a particular type 
of situation; and the capacity so to judge can never be reduced to the application of 
any set of rules. This perspective is of course not merely Aristotle's; in his 
understanding of the general structure of ethics he speaks for his whole culture. 
And there is yet a third respect in which that culture contrasts relevantly with our 
own. 
Morality is on the distinctively modem view concerned with the question of 
what particular actions we should perform; to be moral is to accept certain 
rule-prescribed constraints upon the type of particular action that we undertake. 
Whereas for Aristotle, as for the ancient and medieval worlds in general, morality is 
concerned with the character of a whole human life and individual actions are 
important as they express and as they contribute to that character. Hence for those 
earlier cultures the question of the relative place of various goods in a whole human 
life had to be raised, if not answered, whereas this question is scarcely touched on 
at all in contemporary writing. 
Individual agents, rules, individual actions · this triad provides the conceptual 
iron rations of :recent moral philosophy. To this conceptual triad we need to add a 
thesis: that no satisfactory �ccount of the status of the rules thus conceived appears 
to be possible. Accounts admittedly abound; but no shared rational criteria appear 
to exist by appeal to which a verdict on their disputed claims might be delivered. 
Rule-utilitarians contend with act-utilitarians and both with the heirs of Kant; 
contract theorists of one kind contend with natural rights theorists of another; 
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conflicting :syntheses of rival views are not in short supply. It would be a substantial 
undertaking to go from the simple sociological observation that this is the case to 
any explanation of why it is so; therefore for the moment I shall only hazard a brief 
hypothesis. It is that the concepts which inform the crucial major premises of each 
of the calfticting parties in contemporary moral philosophy are fragments torn from 
a variety of historical contexts in which they were once at home. In those contexts 
each - concepts of happiness, of rights, of justiice, of rationality - was the part of 
some larger metaphysical scheme which was lefi behind as a condition of entering 
the domain of modern moral philosophy. Utilitarians no longer appeal · to 
Bentham's psychology or theory of knowledge, Kantians do not affirm the 
existence of a noumenal realm, the notion of justice has been detached from that of 
a hierarchy of desert. It is, if this hypothesis is correct, small wonder that there is 
no commonly accepted court of appeal in moral philosophy, for the metaphysical 
background required to supply it has become unavailable. Yet even if this 
suggestion of mine is false, it remains a de facto truth that disputes about the status 
and authority of rules do not seem capable of satisfactory resolution within the 
self-set limits of recent moral philosophy . It is perhaps a consequent-e of this that 
disputes between rival and conflicting rules in morality seem, on the account given 
of morality within such moral philosophy, to be equally unsusceptible of rational 
settlement. In debates about the morality of war rules enjoining obedience to the 
ultimately medieval conceptiou of a just war are contraposed to rules from the 
Italian Renascence instructing us to break the first set of rules in order to preserve 
the state; in debates about abortion claims about the rights of women over their 
own bodies deriving from Maiy Wolstonecraft and beyond her John Locke are met with 
claims about the taking of innocent embroyonic life constituting murder deriving 
from the Bible. On both sides some rule makes a claim upon us which we have no 
rational means of weighing against the rival claims of other rules. Thus it seems to 
be a consequence of the way in which moral problems are characterized by recent 
moral philosophy that they are in fact rationally insoluble. Some recent moral 
philosophers, C.L. Stevenson, for example, have accepted this conclusion ; others -
most others - have resisted it. Here I shall simply have to assert briefly and 
dogmatically that I do not think that any of them have found the resources to resist 
it successfully. 
III 
In the first part of this paper I characterized the present crisis in moral thinking 
about medicine; in the second part I described the unacknowledged crisis in 
philosophical ethics. I hope that it will now be clear why medical ethics has, very 
little to learn from ethics. For my claims about medical ethics amounted to this: 
that the way in ,which the role of the physician had been put in question by recent 
developments within medicine and the way in which simultaneously the once 
congruent goods pursued by medical practice had become incongruent had left the 
physician with a set of inherited rules which turned out on many types of 
important occasions to enjoin incompatible types of action. Hence the problems of 
medical ethics appear as a series of dilemmas in which moral agents look for good 
reasons to give weight and authority to one rule rather than another in situations of 
conflict. Consider three familiar types of examp le. 
(1) A physician has a patient whose condition is slowly and steadily 
deteriorating and who requires treatment to keep him alive. The patient is in quite 
considerable pain and has a life of very limited activity. The patient foresees a. time 
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when as a result of further deterioration he wi:l no longer be treated as a fully 
responsible and rati onal being, although still conscious and to some degree active. 
He asks his physician in advance to discontinue treatment when that time arrives. 
What ought the physician to do? 
(2) A physician, for some reason that seems good to him, has instructed a nurse 
that a particular patien t is not to be told that he is dying. The physician sees the 
patient only for short periods at intervals of some days. The nuise spends several 
hours close to the patient every day and the patient has come to trust him. The 
patient becomes increasingly anxious about his own future and asks the nurse 
whether he is going to recover or not. What ought the nurse to do? 
(3) A retired impoverished widower, whose only remaining interest in life is his 
job as driver of a school bus, goes to his physician Cor his annual check-up and 
learns that he has a heart condition of some seriousness. The physician tells him 
that there is a high chance that he will have a heart-attack and that he must stop 
driving the school bus. The patient refuses to do this. What should the physician 
do? 
Each of these three types of problems can easily be presented, and usually is 
presented in the form of a dilemma, that is a problem of choice between 
contingently rival and competing rules. In the first type of case the physician has to 
choose between the authority of the rules that prescribe that the physician do 
everything in his power to prevent death and the authority of the rule that enjoins 
upon the physician the promotion of the general well-being of his patient. In the 
second type of case the nurse has a similar choice between the rule that enjoins a 
nurse to obey a physician's instructions and the rule that upholds honesty in 
important human relationships. In the third type of case the physician has to 
choose between respecting the rule that ordains confidentiality between physician 
and patient and the rule that prescribes whatever action will prevent possible 
imminent harm to innocent hurnalil life, especially that of children. 
For each of the six rules concerned it is possible to adduce excellent 
Kantian-type justification and excellent uti1itarian justifications. What we cannot 
discover, however, within the stock of justifications advanced within recent moral 
philosophy are any grounds for giving some rules preference over others in any 
situation in which two or more rules provide conflicting injunctions. We therefore 
are left with genuine dilemmas: an agent in each type of case considers what to do 
on a particu lar occasion and has no means of deciding between rules. This is the 
form in which such problems are presented in most books and articles on medical 
ethics. Presented in this form the problems appear rationally insoluble. Presented in 
this form the problems are rationally insoluble. So the student of medical ethics 
turns to moral philosophy. What does he learn, if my account of the state of that 
discipline is correct? That this dilemmatic form is the necessary and essential form 
of all moral problems as such ; that the conceptual resources of moral philosophy 
can provide no further and more illuminating characterisation of the problems; and 
hence that the problems are indeed rationally insoluble. Ethics turns out to be 
barren of insight not already possessed by medical ethics, except insofar as it 
suggests that the conceptual scheme which dominates it is deeply inadequate. And 
interestingly in suggesting this it confirms what would also be suggested by 
considering how these three types of problem have been generated within medicine. 
For in the all too cursory history with which I began it emerged that such problems 
had two related sources: they arise partly because the goods pursued by the 
physician have become to some degree mutually incongruent; and they arise partly 
because the inherited roles and relationships of medicine have been put in 
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question or partially disrupted. Goods, roles, relationships: are these the missing 
concepts without which the notions of agent choice and rule become morally 
powerless? This is the question to which the whole argumen t directs us. 
IV 
Begin from what must seem at first an almost trivial observation about the third 
type of example of a problem. If the local School Board insisted on mandatory 
annual medical examinations by a physician appointed by it for all its bus drive.rs, 
the problem for the physician would never arise. A simple change in institutional 
arrangements would so alter the relationship of physician to patient, would so alter 
the physician's role, that the circumstances which created the ·conflict of rules 
would be eliminated. This suggests two theres in favor of which I shall argue for the 
rest of this paper. The first is that wherever we are confronted with an insoluble 
dilemma we should not try to solve It; we should try to prevent it arising. If we do 
not know how to choose between rules, it does not follow that we do not know 
how to choose between types of institutional arrangement. We cannot eliminate 
moral problems, but by altering our institutional arrangements we can choose what 
types of problem to have. Politics - in the Aristotelian sense - preceeds ethicst just as 
Aristotle said it did. 
The second thesis is that rules are less fundamental than roles and relationships 
and that it is the context which roles and relationships provide which alone makes 
sense of rules. But roles and relationships themselves require elucidation in terms of 
goods. Medicine is after all an ordered form of human practice and it involves the 
pursuit of at least two kinds of good. There is  the good of the patient whose health, 
life and general well-being are at stake. And there are those goods achieved by that 
extension of human creative powers which t.he history of medicine embodies. For 
medicine pursues excellence in its activity, just as natural !)cience doe!) or the visual 
arts or athletics. But clearly the first of these goods has priority over the second; for 
the measure of excellence in medical achievement lies in the end in the good of the 
patient. The key question thus becomes: in what relationship must the patient 
stand to the physician in order for the goods of medicine to be rightly ordered? 
Two things at once become clear, when this question is posed. The first is that to 
answer it at all we need to bring upon the scene additional concepts to specify 
types of possible relationship. The second is that it turns out that there may be 
more than one satisfactory answer to it. 
For my additional concepts once again I turn to Aristotle's thought as a 
resource. Modern readers of Aristotle scanning his account of the virtues are 
unsurprised by the prominence given to such virtues as courage of self-restraint, but 
very surprised when friendship turns out, on his view, to be a virtue and a virtue as 
fundamental as justice. Aristotle argues that both the relationship between free 
citizens in a city-state and the relationship of husband and wife need to be 
elucidated in terms of the notion of friendship. Not only according to Aristotle, but 
according to classical Greek thought generally, at the opposite pole to the friend is 
the stranger. To a friend you are tied by your concern for goods that are both his 
and yours and his concern for the same goods (Aristotle treats as inferior forms of 
friendship those that are based on�y on pleasure in each other's company or on 
mutual utility). To a stranger you ave no ties at all; you do not even necessarily 
sha.re any conception of goods. With a friend you share the duties, obligations and 
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other moral constraints imposed by the aulhutrily of the goods you mutually 
recognize. With a stranger you share initially nothing; and whatever arises between 
you will necessarily rest, if you are prudent, on enforceable contracts and if you are 
imprudent, on force or seduction. 
Modern moral philosophy books never mention friends or stangers. They are 
indeed categories excluded by the abstract characterisation of the moral agent. Nor 
do we find friends and strangers mentioned by the immediate progenitors of 
modern moral philosophy. Kant and Mill. But if we make notions of roles and 
relationships central, then at once we have to think in terms of friends and 
strangers. For Aristotle was right in recognizing that roles and relationships must all 
be characterized in terms of this dimension of human existence. Let us return to 
the question: in what relationship to each other should the physician and the 
patient stand? 
I now answer: either as friends or as strangers. What would be involved in each 
of these answers? Consider the first example of a problem, that concerning a certain 
type of incurable patient. The qut!stion is: who is to make the decisions about the 
life or death of such a patient. There are very strong reasons for initially giving the 
answer: the ·patient himself. It is after all his and no one else's good that is at stake. 
But the problem is that as a patient moves towards the state described in the 
example, the patient tends to lose autonomy to become dependent and, in the eyes 
of others and perhaps in his own eyes, to become less capable of making decisions 
that should be respected. The sick role returns us all in some ways to childhood, 
and never more so than in the case of the incurable patient. We therefore might be 
inclined to amend our first attempt at an answer as follows: the patient must 
decide, but not the patient as he is now, once he has become incurable and 
distressed and weakened and dependent. The potentially incurable patient - and 
that is all of us, physicians as well as laymen - must exercise his rational will in 
advance, must say, in binding form, perhaps the form of a sworn document, what 
he would have others do in this type of situation. While I am still autonomous, I 
must speak for myself when I shall no longer be so. The difficulty with this answer 
is one that arises for many types of attempt to bind myself in advance. So great is 
the unpr�ictable character of ourselves to ourselves, that at fifty I would be very 
reluctant to consent to being whatever I willed that I should be when I was twenty. 
It the ref ore would seem that any earlier expressions of my will for myself when I 
am incurable and distressed need to be supplemented by someone who is able to 
speak for me in the present, about what I would have wished. The patient in other 
words needs a friend, someone who has long since made the patient's good his own. 
Who is this friend to be? 
We can recognize at once that in some times and places this role of the patient's 
friend has been filled by the physician. Two conditions had to be satisfied for this 
to be so. 'l'he first was that the physician stood in a long-term relationship to the 
patient and the patient's family, a presence at births and deaths. The second was 
that physician and patient shared in essentially the same moral point of view. When 
both these conditions are satisfied the physician is able genuinely to speak for the 
patient as well as to him. Where either or both cannot be satisfied, as they usually 
cannot be satisfied in contemporary medical practice, then the physician cannot be 
in an Aristotelian sense the patient's friend. 
But if physician and patient cannot be related as friend to friend, they must be 
related as stranger to stranger. Their relationship, that is, ought to become purely 
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and only contractual. The physician becomes no more and no less than the patient's 
agent in the patient's pursuit of his own well-being. A physician would on this view 
stand to a patient precisely as a lawyer stands to a client. The lawyer's duty is to 
advise his client of all the alternative courses of action open to the client and of the 
legal consequences of each; there his duty terminates. He makes no decisions; those 
are reserved for the client. The consequences for examples of the first type are 
clear. The physician, if a stranger, has no problem. If a friend, he will have to 
exercise a sensitive judgment on his friend the patient's behalf, but whatever he 
does to the best of that judgment will be acceptable. What is outstandingly clear 
however is that without some specification of tb.e physician-patient relationship in 
terms of the friend-stranger dimension , we have an insoluble dilemma, where any 
choice is arbitrary. 
Are physicians thus to be friends or strangers? The question is of course one 
about the forms of organizatiop of health care. The emotive overtones of the words 
'friend' and 'stranger' may too easily suggest that it is better for physicians to be 
friends than to be strangers, if this is at all possible. But I am not suggesting this. 
There are some types of relationship in which it is clearly better, or at least is good, 
to deal with strangers as with friends. One's relationship to one's legal advisor may 
well be a case in point . What I am contending is that until we systematically choose 
to define the physician's rol� in terms of one alternative form of relationship or the 
other, we shall have no way of putling the variety of moral rules which contend for 
our allegiance in any sort of order. 
As with the first example, so also with the second. The triadic 
physician-nurse-patient relationship can be specified either in terms of friends or of 
strangers. If the relationship is of the first kind, then the problem posed in the 
second example could not arise, because between friends the kind of instruction 
given in the example by the physician to the nurse could not be given. But if the 
relationship is to be one between strangers, then it will have to be defined by a new 
contract between the physicians and surgeons on the one hand and the nurses on 
the other and that contract, like all merely contractual relationship, will express the 
relationship of force and influence between the contracting parties at the time the 
contract is signed, whether literally or metaphorically. For contracts between 
strangers are made when one party cannot or cannot any longer enforce their will 
upon the other. 
Problems of medical ethics therefore are secondary to problems of medical 
organization; and problems of medical organization tum out to have a crucial moral 
dimension. For insofar as choices between forms of organization have implications 
for role-definition, they at least partially determine moral problems we will 
encounter. 
v 
It is now possible to summarize what ethics has to learn from medical ethics. 
The first lesson is that no one is ever an abstract moral agent. Moral agency is 
embodied in roles such as that of the physician, the patient or the nurse; and roles 
are mutually interdefined in terms of types of relationship. Secondly it is clear that 
the place of rules in moral life is secondary to the place of goods, roles and 
relationships. There is no way to answer the question:  "Which moral rules ought I 
to respect in this situation?" until I have first answered the question "Who am I and 
what is my concrete relationship to the other people involved in this situation?" 
Thirdly the focus of our moral choice ought to be not upon alternative actions in 
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particular situation, but on whole forms of life, on whole alternative ways of 
organizing our roles and relationships in such contexts as those of medical practice 
and on the goods to be aclhieved by such ways of life. Fourthly the argument has 
cast some doubt on whether there ought to be such a subject as ethics or moral 
philosophy as such. For if moral agency is exercised through roles, then the 
questions that ought to be addressed are much more specific than those with which 
moral philosophy is conventionally concerned. The questions I have touched on 
today are specific to medicine; but there are parallel questions specific to family 
life, to politics, to life in schools and universities and so on. The moral agent turns 
out to be no more and no less than both the sum and the unity of his roles 
embodied in a single person. The abstract ghost of conventional ethics, man as such, 
with his impoverished conceptual existence has to be replaced by this much more 
interesting figure. 
Whether ethics will be able to learn what medical ethics has to teach it remains 
to be seen. We have at the moment grounds for both optimism and pessimism. But 
if ethics as it is studied in this country is ever to be reformed, it will, I am quite 
certain, be because medical ethics will have led the way. And this should not 
surprise us; Hippocrates said long ago that philosophy has more to learn from 
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